[FD] Multiple vulnerabilities discovered in dnaLIMS DNA sequencing web-application

Title: Multiple vulnerabilities discovered in dnaLIMS DNA sequencing web-application Advisory URL: http://ift.tt/2m3m0Kj Date published: Mar 08, 2017 Vendor: dnaTools, Inc. CVE IDs: [2017-6526, 2017-6527, 2017-6528, 2017-6529] USCERT VU: 929263 Vulnerability Summaries 1) Improperly protected web shell [CVE-2017-6526] dnaLIMS requires authentication to view cgi-bin/dna/sysAdmin.cgi, which is a web shell included with the software running as the web user. However, sending a POST request to that page bypasses authentication checks, including the UID parameter within the POST request. 2) Unauthenticated Directory Traversal [CVE-2017-6527] The viewAppletFsa.cgi seqID parameter is vulnerable to a null terminated directory traversal attack. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve files on the operating system accessible by the permissions of the web server. This page also does not require authentication, allowing any person on the Internet to exploit this vulnerability. 3) Insecure Password Storage [CVE-2017-6528] An option, which is most likely the default, allows the password file (/home/dna/spool/.pfile) to store clear text passwords. When combined with the unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability, it is possible to gain the username and password for all users of the software and gain complete control of the software. 4) Session Hijacking [CVE-2017-6529] Each user of the dnaLIMS software is assigned a unique four-digit user identification number(UID) upon account creation. These numbers appear to be assigned sequentially. Multiple pages of the dnaLIMS application require that this UID be passed as a URL parameter in order to view the content of the page. Consider the following example: The URL ‘http:///cgi-bin/dna/seqreq2N.cgi?username=61685578,2410’ is a valid URL to view the page for sequencing requests for the user with the UID of 2410. The username parameter of the URL is the mechanism for authentication to the system. The first eight-digit number of the username parameter appears to be a session identifier as it changes every time the user logs in from the password.cgi page, however this value is not checked by the seqreq2N.cgi page. This allows an attacker to guess the four-digit UID of valid user accounts that have an active session. The user with the UID of 2419 currently has an active session, so we can simply hijack this user’s session by requesting this page and specifying the UID 2419. 5) Cross-site Scripting The seqID parameter of the viewAppletFsa.cgi page is vulnerable to a reflected cross site scripting attack via GET request as seen in the following URL: http://<SERVER NAME REDACTED>/cgi-bin/dna/viewAppletFsa.cgi?seqID=7415-7<SCRIPT Alert("XSS") </SCRIPT> 6) Cross-site Scripting The navUserName parameter of the seqTable*.cgi page is vulnerable to a reflected cross site scripting attack via POST request as seen in the example below. The * reflects a short name for a client, (ie Shorebreak Security may be seqTableSS.cgi or seqTableshorebreak.cgi) and may not be vulnerable for all dnaLIMS installs. 7) Improperly Protected Content Many of the pages within the admin interface are not properly protected from viewing by authenticated users. This can give an attacker additional system information about the system, or change system/software configuration. Software was conducted on a live production system, therefore the pages themselves were tested, forms within these pages were not. This is also not an exhaustive list of improperly protected pages: cgi-bin/dna/configuration.cgi cgi-bin/dna/createCoInfo.cgi cgi-bin/dna/configSystem.cgi cgi-bin/dna/combineAcctsN.cgi Disclosure Timeline Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:25 PM: Reached out to vendor requesting PGP key to securely exchange details of vulnerabilities identified Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:55 PM: Vendor requests report be physically mailed to PO box via Postal Service Wed, Nov 16, 2016, at 11:14 AM: Report mailed to vendor via USPS Certified Mail Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 10:43 AM: Request Vendor acknowledge receipt of the report Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 12:53 PM: Vendor acknowledges receipt; suggests placing the software behind a firewall as a solution to the vulnerabilities. Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 1:54 PM: Reply that the offered solution mitigates some risk, but does not address the vulnerabilities; inquire if there is a plan to address the vulnerabilities Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 3:13 PM: Vendor replies “…Yes, we have a plan. Please gather a DNA sequence, PO Number, or Fund Number and go to your local grocery store and see what it will buy you.” Tue, Feb 28, 2017, at 1:15 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed to US-CERT Tue, Mar 7, 2017, at 8:19 AM: Vulnerabilities submitted to MITRE for CVE assignment Wed, Mar 8, 2017, at 12:00 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed publicly <br><br> Source: Gmail -> IFTTT-> Blogger